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William H. Pickens


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From left to right behind FDR: Cong. Dennis Chavez, Sen. Francis Case, Sen. Hugh Scott, Sen. Bronson Cutting, Sen. Sam G. Bratton.  
Courtesy Albuquerque Journal.

BRONSON CUTTING VS. DENNIS CHAVEZ:  
BATTLE OF THE PATRONES IN NEW MEXICO, 1934

WILLIAM H. PICKENS

FOR THE FIRST TIME in its history, New Mexico has a clean cut political issue, the welfare of the people on one side, and every self-ish interest on the other." Bronson Murray Cutting paused and smoothed back the hair which had matted on his forehead in the sultry Albuquerque Armory. The crowd generously applauded and again the senior senator's voice filled the October night:

The Democratic party in New Mexico has adopted a policy that was and is excoriated by the democratic president of the United States. That shows you the futility of the two party system. That shows you there are only two positions that an individual or a party can take. You are either for or against the laboring man, the farmer, the small citizens, the welfare of those who cannot take care of themselves.<sup>1</sup>

Since the year was 1934, the place Depression America, and those who could not help themselves probably a majority of U.S. citizens, Cutting's listeners understood and approved his words.

By November 2, with the long campaign near its end, Congressman Dennis Chavez, the opponent of Bronson Cutting, was likewise adamant:

The legislation I shall sponsor and strive to get enacted, if I am elected to the U.S. Senate, shall be the legislation the majority of the citizens want sponsored and enacted. I shall never assume the attitude that I know what is best for the people, and that I am so much wiser than they are that my opinion is unquestionable and the only correct one. I shall never strive to be or pose as a political dictator in any sense of the word.<sup>2</sup>

These quotations indicate the contrast between Bronson Cutting and Dennis Chavez during one of the most crucial campaigns in New Mexico's history. The voters were forced to choose between the two most powerful public figures which the parties could offer. Since the early nineteen twenties, however, Cutting and Chavez had been strangers in virtually every trait of character and breeding except for their similar political aspirations. The succeeding decade was to twist their lives into strange shapes. In a drama reminiscent of Thornton Wilder's bridge at San Luis Rey these two men were to meet over the finest prize in New Mexico politics: a seat in the United States Senate.

It is strange that such a remarkable moment in our state's history has not generated more profound explanations. The several interpretations which have appeared tend toward uniformity. None of them explain both the larger aspects of the campaign and the compelling personalities of the candidates. I should like to raise a few questions in an attempt to clarify the data which scholars have gathered over the years.

First, what sort of man was Bronson Cutting: a consistent charlatan or a humane Progressive? Was he an astute opportunist who cunningly mobilized poor Spanish-speaking farmers, wealthy oilmen, and fraternal veterans, or did his patrician character bridge the gaps honestly and openly? Cutting's personality has been widely explored,<sup>3</sup> but his political philosophy has too often been left untouched by students of this era. Second, although Dennis Chavez in 1934 was hardly as complicated a man as Cutting, in a limited way, shaped by his ethnic background, he was just as eccentric. For instance, why did Chavez risk his political future in a clash with the invincible senior senator when he probably could have defeated interim Senator Carl Hatch in the primary and easily won a seat across the aisle from Cutting? Is the only answer, as postulated by several studies, that he desired to replace Cutting as New Mexico's *patrón*?<sup>4</sup> Finally, the New Deal must be mentioned. It was years after Bronson Cutting's death before reasonable speculation appeared concerning Roosevelt's reason for endorsing the more conservative Chavez who had supported John

Nance Garner for the Democratic nomination in 1932.<sup>5</sup> This article seeks to portray the drama of the collision between these two unique personalities, and to illuminate the larger outlines of the New Deal in New Mexico and ways that depression was shaping political consciousness. After sketching the political lives of Cutting and Chavez—1934 was merely the termination of a long process—I shall offer some tentative answers to the questions posed above.

### I. BRONSON CUTTING IN NEW MEXICO

CUTTING was a transplant from high society on Long Island, a graduate of Groton and Harvard. Suffering from tuberculosis, he came to New Mexico on a stretcher in 1910. Here this flamboyant personality regained his health enough to become state secretary for Roosevelt's Bull Moosers two years later. Cutting's career for the next twenty years, during which he successively wore the label Progressive, Democrat, and Republican, mirrored his character: he was erratic, confident, aggressive, yet he always maintained a polished compassion which endeared him in ways similar to those of his Harvard classmate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Cutting was often unpredictable, except when aroused in the political arena. His many enemies could always testify to the awesome if unorthodox force he marshaled against them. Had it not been for his great wealth and his ownership of the *Santa Fe New Mexican*, Cutting undoubtedly would have been ignored in serious political circles. The number of his biographers indicates that the man and his successes were singular, and that his career was even more vivid because his style was not indigenous to political New Mexico.<sup>6</sup>

For the beginnings of Cutting's political strength we must return to his quarrel with Democratic Governor Arthur T. Hannett in 1925. There was a long tradition in the state that public men needed some special focus for their attention between elections so that in even Novembers they could form coalitions representing a broad spectrum of accomplishments. As a concerned citizen, Bronson Cutting seized upon the idea of a labor commissioner and a

veterans' bureau as justifiable services of government. Hannett, who was determined to do a constructive if conservative job for New Mexico, dismissed the proposals as extravagant and aimed solely at mobilizing votes.<sup>7</sup> Hannett argued that the state was too poor for such projects and, indeed, the cost of all state and local services during the next fiscal year was a modest sixteen million dollars.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps more crucial to the rejection of Cutting's proposals was the pervasive philosophy among officials that the primary responsibility of the social authority was the gentle guidance and protection of citizens, especially from one another. Government in agricultural New Mexico had always performed the tasks that were unprofitable or entirely unsuited to private enterprise, but needed for orderly administration. The forte of these politicians was rhetoric, not public action. Both parties firmly believed that fundamental changes should come from the private sector and only afterwards be seconded by governmental action. Organized labor was painfully weak in New Mexico, and conservative Republicans, along with many Democrats, did not feel that state government had the resources or the mandate to change that condition. They also insisted that veterans' affairs were Federal business and that parallel operations would be wasteful. This was, of course, exactly the pattern which was to develop in almost every agency during the New Deal.<sup>9</sup>

As a result of this rebuke, Bronson Cutting threw his financial support to Hannett's Republican opponent in 1926, and was rewarded by appointment to the vacant seat of the late Senator A. A. Jones in 1927. While critical questions about his reliability plagued party stalwarts back home, he hurried to Washington. Reports filtered back, however, that Cutting appeared orthodox:

The administration forces did not know how to place him. Last week I [J. M. Hervey] made the acquaintance of several influential Republicans in the House and Senate and they all said that they were very much disappointed that you [Governor Richard Dillon] did not send a dependable Republican up here. . . .

However, the first test came yesterday and he voted on two occasions with the straight Republican ticket.<sup>10</sup>

Cutting's political mentor, Governor Dillon, made the same points in the 1928 campaign: "Senator Cutting is safeguarding our tariff interests in the Senate. . . . He has fearlessly championed . . . the protective tariff, conservancy . . . [and] public land restored to state ownership."<sup>11</sup> The neophyte had clearly adopted the tenets of New Mexico Republicanism during its finest hours—or had he forgotten the expansion of government which he had advocated earlier?

THE REPUBLICANS were swept into office in the 1928 campaign, winning every statewide race by margins that threatened to wreck the political balance since statehood. Even the GOP leaders were stunned. The *Albuquerque Journal* wondered whether the Democrats were in permanent eclipse.<sup>12</sup> Burdened with Governor Al Smith of New York, a wet Catholic, as their candidate for President, the Democrats lost even their traditional support in the eastern, Baptist counties of New Mexico. From the statewide perspective the essential point was that the Republicans had forged the most powerful coalition in New Mexico's history, with Bronson Cutting, Charles Springer, and Richard Dillon each contributing a significant bloc of votes. Spanish-speaking farmers and their brothers in the barrios had voted solidly along with sheepmen and wealthy commercial interests for Republican prosperity. Even organized labor went GOP.<sup>13</sup> An analysis of the components of this grand coalition will indicate the possibilities which Bronson Cutting saw for permanent Republican strength.

Impoverished Spanish Americans<sup>14</sup> lived all along the Rio Grande and its tributaries. The tradition of dividing land among all surviving sons had splintered their agricultural production into miniscule units: in 1930 about 10,000 of the 31,404 farms had less than fifty acres and most were in central New Mexico.<sup>15</sup> "Accelerated soil erosion"<sup>16</sup> and lack of formal training in the tech-

niques of intensive cultivation guaranteed that they would remain subsistence farmers while at the same time, their relatives in the towns

battle[d] their own cultural inadequacy. . . . They [had] no tradition of competition, of education, or of Western Civilization beyond the Sixteenth Century.<sup>17</sup>

These New Mexicans were analogous in some ways to the immigrants who had swarmed into America since the 1890's. They had deep cultural traditions which they wished to maintain—Spanish—but rejected their immediate heritage from Mexico. Their language was often considered inferior, perhaps because it did not well express Anglo-American values of commercialism and individualism. Their religion was stringent and sensuously pagan to many of their non-Catholic neighbors. These Spanish-speaking people were both “sensitive and proud,”<sup>18</sup> while many of them occupied a servant status and a makeshift, manipulated citizenship. Either overtly or subtly, these people were constantly accused of inferiority, and they reacted much the same as did new Americans in the industrial centers of the east who were likewise organized into massive political blocs. Clustering under the *patrón* for jobs and political advice, Spanish Americans in the Rio Grande Valley also looked for some protection against the strange, new Anglo ways which intruded on every side.<sup>19</sup>

There were differences, however, between the new wave of immigrants which swept onto America's eastern shores after 1890 and these Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. Unfortunately, the discrepancies made the latter less amenable to political change. First of all, they were hardly newcomers. Often their families extended far back into the colonial past, and most held some piece of land which had formerly been part of an extensive grant fragmented through equal inheritance, sale, or outright fraud. Secondly, until 1940 Spanish surnames were in the numerical majority in New Mexico. Slowly, and most painfully, they saw their domination dwindling away<sup>20</sup> and this kindled a fierce reactionary streak and



an insistence on biculturalism which was not as evident among eastern immigrants. A terrible paradox haunted these citizens: they revered a past and a heritage which had little relevance to the euphoria of the American Twenties or to the desperation of the Thirties. At the same time, they shared the dream of material abundance which permeated our nation during these years. In effect, these Spanish Americans were locked in a position neither in nor out of American society. Although they neither wished nor were compelled to abandon their indigenous heritage, they sought the new advantages which, rightly or wrongly, were incompatible with that heritage. They were segregated but unorganized. In order to secure their votes, both Dennis Chavez and Bronson Cutting had to find some kind of solution to this dilemma.

These frustrated Spanish Americans adored Bronson Cutting. Consistently, he employed their brothers, fought for their candidates, and conversed in their tongue.<sup>21</sup> Cutting first protected their interests in 1926 when he opposed Governor Hannett's election reforms which would have prohibited straight party tickets and assistance within the voting booth. Such provisions were common in other states, but Cutting argued that the high proportion of Spanish-speaking illiterates in New Mexico meant that they would be disfranchised by such a scheme. In spite of such moralistic hindsight as that of Warren Beck, who asserted that attacks on the Election Code were "bigoted, sordid, and irresponsible,"<sup>22</sup> there is much evidence that many New Mexicans would have been prevented from voting.<sup>23</sup> At any rate, this was the prevailing opinion, and villagers along the Rio Grande loved the handsome Anglo from Harvard who seemed honestly interested in protecting them not only from such diabolical desires as they believed Hannett harbored but also from the Spanish patrones who had exploited them for centuries. But more than this, as he traveled extensively in their midst, the wealthy Cutting became a symbol of affluent and comfortable America, while his aesthetic love of their heritage convinced them that such duality was not anachronistic. Further, Cutting's distaste for men of his own political standing (mostly shrewd Anglos) increased his fondness for the unaffected life of the leath-

er-faced farmer whose Hispanic hospitality and fiery fiestas charmed the patrician. Furthermore, these people took Bronson Cutting very seriously while many leaders of his own community laughed at everything except his money. For his own part, Cutting understood that Spanish Americans could love him more than a man from their own ethnic background since he combined the divergent motivations in their hearts. In addition, he did not compete with them: his political rise would not implicitly demean them as the ascendancy of a leader from their own ranks might. In 1934 Dennis Chavez was certain that his people would support their own, but he failed to reckon with these powerful undercurrents.

Another crucial segment of the voting population was the workers. Although only 4,476 persons were officially categorized as wage earners in 1929,<sup>24</sup> their families and the expanding towns promised to make them a potent new factor in the balance of power. Their impact was felt in the eastern counties, especially where oil had been discovered in 1924. By 1930 New Mexico had become one of the leading oil states,<sup>25</sup> and the oil fields were the most important reason for the six counties' climb from 12.4 per cent of the state's total vote in 1926 to 17 per cent in 1934.<sup>26</sup> It was also becoming apparent that the lower-middle-class mercantile interests which provided a foundation for the struggling towns had a common stake with many laborers, certainly with those who extracted natural resources. The Depression served to drive both groups closer together as Cutting's speeches in 1934 indicate.

These, then, were the political possibilities which absorbed the Senator from New Mexico. How Cutting protected and promoted the interests of these divergent groups has been neglected by historians—possibly because Cutting's erratic practice of politics is much more engaging. Likewise, most accounts only contain the violent reactions which he elicited: “ ‘[Hannett's] political ruin was due to Bronson Cutting, a political Frankenstein who turned upon anyone he could not dominate, Republican or Democrat alike.’ ”<sup>27</sup> Such remarks have led even sympathetic biographers to emphasize unduly Cutting's irascibility, his inconsistency, or his

luck. It is time that these colorful reviews of his antics be restored to their proper perspective by due attention to the Senator's numerous attempts to weld together the two most substantial groups in political New Mexico.<sup>28</sup>

ONLY ONCE during the Twenties was Cutting able to convince his Republican allies that such a coalition should be established through legislative action. On January 23, 1929, the Speaker of the New Mexico House of Representatives and two other legislators introduced a strong proposal for a labor commissioner with the power "to require the performance of any act that is necessary for protection of life, health, and safety of employees."<sup>29</sup> The story of the ensuing explosion within the Republican Party has been well documented. In brief, the struggle became one between U.S. Senator Bronson Cutting who led the "governmental expansionists" and Charles Springer who controlled the "Old Guard." Springer distrusted any artificial coalition between Republicans and working men. Rumors of high-powered politics were rampant. Newspapers devoted most of their space to debates on the Bill and editorials on the debaters. In the heat of the controversy, the Republican Majority Leader in the Senate resigned, "stating as his reason that he could not vote for the Republican [platform] pledge of establishing a Labor Commission."<sup>30</sup> The legislature was deadlocked for six weeks and no agreement was reached on any major law until the fifty-eighth day of the sixty-day session. On March 8, the last day, the Labor Commissioner Bill came before the Senate for final consideration after the lower chamber had narrowly passed it. The drama of that particular debate was incredibly intense. Almost every political figure in the state was present, including Cutting who missed President-elect Hoover's inauguration for this moment. Defeat came for the Bill after hours of pounding applause, emotive speeches, jeers, and violence on the Senate floor, but no one really won. The bedraggled opponents of the proposed labor commission stood afterwards jabbering among themselves. Perhaps they realized that their own sun was setting. As Charles

Judah said, "the Republican Party in New Mexico was butchered by its own leaders."<sup>31</sup>

One of the most misunderstood parts of Cutting's career is his role in this fight. The usual explanation is that he merely sought control of the Republican Party and seized this as a likely issue. Andrea A. Parker's recent analysis continues this interpretation:

Cutting decided upon the Labor Commissioner as the test of strength. . . . The formation of an office of State Labor Commissioner had been the excuse used by Cutting to break relations with the Republican Party.<sup>32</sup>

Such a view insists that the Old Guard cared little about the substance of the Bill since it was probably unenforceable, but that they wanted Cutting dispatched to Washington and his links to the legislative party severed. Adherents of this interpretation insist that the Depression caused further loss of faith in the GOP and that Roosevelt's largess cemented the poor of New Mexico into Democratic ranks. They also view Cutting's assistance to the Democrats as undermining every effort to reunite his adopted Republican Party. Such conclusions make several errors.

First, this group argues that success spoiled the 1928 Republicans so that they fell to criticizing one another rather than the Democrats. In addition to assuming that GOP leaders were a good deal less shrewd than they were, this perspective does not account for much legislative history in New Mexico. Republicans had exercised similar control before statehood but had not disagreed so violently. After 1912, they controlled the legislature twice, just as solidly as in 1929, yet such breaches had not occurred.<sup>33</sup> Defeat for the Labor Commissioner Bill stemmed from the fact that strong and bipartisan forces were always aligned against any new proposal which might tighten the finances of the state or cause reorganization of the system. Republicans were justifiably suspicious that their support of the laboring man might lose them the votes of wealthy New Mexicans.

The second error of proponents of the "Cutting schism" is their

insistence that neither side was truly concerned with the Labor Bill reforms, that it was merely a convenient issue for domination of the Party. They contend that the issue was political and not economic. This ignores the fact that several other controversial measures were presented to the legislature. Among these were additional free textbook legislation, an appropriations bill opposed by the powerful Taxpayers Association, a sweeping Workmen's Compensation Act, a new securities bill, a measure enlarging the State Highway Department's powers, and proposals for uniform banking laws.<sup>34</sup> Any or all of these issues were better adapted for victories over conservatives, if that had been the sole goal of Cutting progressives, since none of these proposals dealt with extensive institutional additions or seeming "class" legislation.

Bronson Cutting was dumbfounded by the consistent Republican vote of the poor Spanish-American counties. He realized that Republicans such as Charles Springer, Solomon Luna, Charles Spiess, and Thomas B. Catron had effectively adapted the economic patrón system to politics and that they believed peon loyalty to the interests of wealthy landowners both natural and eternal. Cutting insisted that conservatism could not continue to attract votes from the underprivileged majority in New Mexico and that increasing affluence would soon weaken their subservience.<sup>35</sup> He believed that only a solid coalition between Rio Grande agricultural counties and the growing vote of labor in the eastern oil fields could maintain Republicans in power. Other progressives contended that this political front led by Cutting's wealth and his power of the press would be invincible. To them, the Labor Commissioner Bill was the first step toward convincing Anglo workers of the political possibilities of cooperation with the Spanish-American lower class. How else can the solid Spanish-speaking vote in the legislature for this Bill—an Act which had little relevance to their agricultural constituents—be explained?<sup>36</sup> All Republicans had welcomed the coalition which brought the stunning victory of 1928, but only the followers of Bronson Cutting were willing to abandon the old Republican fixtures in order to continue it.

## II. DENNIS CHAVEZ: UP FROM SO. ARNO

WHEN Cutting first adopted this state, he lived in a different world from a thin young rodman who worked for the Albuquerque City Engineer. Dionicio Chavez had been born into one of the oldest families in New Mexico. His desperate father, like so many others who had found little gold in the Gilded Age, moved to the barrio of Barelas in 1895 when Dennis was seven. Forced to leave school after the seventh grade, young Dennis worked in a dingy grocery store on South Arno in Albuquerque.<sup>37</sup> While Cutting was purchasing newspapers and promoting splinter parties, Dennis Chavez was learning the backroom, tough-minded politics which were characteristic of men with few resources other than their wits. In succession, Chavez was defeated for county clerk, appointed state Game Warden, edited a Belen newspaper, and attended Georgetown Law School while serving as assistant to the Executive Clerk of the U.S. Senate. He struggled long hours to overcome the twin handicaps of a limited education and the barriers erected against any aspiring Spanish American, particularly those imposed by his own people. As a result, the contrast with Cutting was striking. Dennis Chavez was rather stern and suspicious in a way common to self-made men. He scratched in the cloakrooms for political opportunities, yet revered the formal rules of politics and government since these had provided his path to success. Political power as exercised by patrones such as E. A. Miera and Thomas B. Catron, who tallied alike the votes of their sheep and the dear departed with those of residents,<sup>38</sup> had impressed the young Chavez, and he frankly determined to emulate them, adapting his own style to more sophisticated times. With dreams and doubts, he rose carefully in politics during New Mexico's Twenties.

By the summer of 1930, New Mexicans had sensed the widening circles of America's economic disturbances. Based as it was on the exploitation of natural resources, the local economy had never been abundant but had been self-supporting and somewhat stable. The Republican defeat in November 1930 did not reflect outright panic but was brought about by the party's disunity and general

uneasiness about national prosperity. Aided by his influential brother, David, in northern counties, Dennis Chavez shared in the Democrats' good fortune. At a convention which marked the rising strength of Bernalillo County, Clyde Tingley switched the votes that gained Chavez a second-ballot nomination for New Mexico's lone seat in the House of Representatives. Such an honor was a debt which the party paid for long service. Chavez was known as a stalwart even in the midst of party faithfuls and was proud of his regularity:

For twenty-two years I have faithfully and loyally supported all democratic nominees from the senators, congressmen, governors down to the county surveyors. At no time has the party found me wanting when it called. . . . I was always willing to do my utmost for the nominee.

Will I get the nomination? I will if the democrats are desirous of getting an additional congressman; if faithfulness, loyalty, and service are to be rewarded.<sup>39</sup>

The campaign of Chavez against Republican Albert Simms was energetic, orthodox, and successful. He trotted out traditional Democratic criticisms of the tariff as "the instrument of the few rather than of the many,"<sup>40</sup> and chastised Republicans for ignoring the needs of his fellow Hispanos. Because of his past support for organized labor and veterans' benefits, Chavez was able to add these groups to his ethnic voters and defeat Simms by 18,000 out of 117,813 votes cast.<sup>41</sup> The old Barons of politics who had run New Mexico since statehood had not exactly elected a man from their midst, but Dennis Chavez was one who followed their lead and was safe in their eyes.

In order to describe Chavez as a congressman, it is necessary to understand the system of political thought which produced him. As a territory, New Mexico had been strongly Republican because the national administration had been dominated by that party since the Civil War. A small group of wealthy aristocrats slowly emerged and carefully wielded the political power delegated to them by

the United States. Leaders such as Albert Bacon Fall, Charles Spiess, Holm Bursum, Nathan Jaffa, Miguel Otero, George Curry, and Harvey Fergusson were spread over the state, and although they often came into conflict, they held a high respect for one another. They had written the state's constitution. They strongly influenced every important public official in the Twenties. So firmly established that nothing could threaten their social position, the political Barons served in most respects as the upper class of New Mexico. In addition to picking candidates for office when they personally declined to serve, many of these men insisted on limited government in New Mexico which would reflect their interests in the community, both state and national.

Because New Mexico had very limited tax resources under such an arrangement, campaign issues were not particularly important for the first two decades after statehood. Much more decisive were the candidate's personality, the party organization, and especially the men who supported him. Politics required a kind of toughness characteristic of the mercantile world but mellowed by a sense of the need for compromise within the knot of professional politicians. True skill was shown (and victory insured) not on the speaker's platform, but rather behind hotel doors where the racial and financial cleavages in New Mexico were squarely confronted. The precarious political balance saw the two parties split evenly for the governorship from 1912 through 1930, while Democrats did well in Congressional races but consistently lost in their bids for the legislature.<sup>42</sup> Intense fear of internecine destruction hung over the parties and made it difficult for any man to establish himself as a potent political force in his own right.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, party loyalty such as that proclaimed by Dennis Chavez became a cardinal virtue.

All these forces made for superficial campaigns. "I am for the constitution in its entirety. I love it all." "The will of the people as a whole must be carried out."<sup>44</sup> These were characteristic remarks by Chavez during the campaign of 1930. Such statements indicated that he held the opinion of the Barons about public authority. Not only did the young congressman learn this from the patricians



under whom he had served as political apprentice, but he himself realized that any increase in the burden of government in New Mexico would crack the citizens financially and destroy any man politically. So, theory, tradition, and practicality merged nicely for Dennis Chavez as the Thirties opened. For him and most other politicians, state government served its constituents by protecting their property and employing about a thousand of those who had served in the successful campaign. Chavez naturally carried many of these views to the national capital. During the period of New Mexico's extreme political immaturity, neither the problems nor the stakes were great, and a timeless conflict of high-powered rhetoric and low-temperature bargaining prevailed. Dennis Chavez became a master at both.

It is clear from the extensive analysis in Edward Lahart's work on the tenure of Chavez as a congressman that practical values guided his decisions. Although simplistic about problems such as foreign affairs and the tariff, Chavez was knowledgeable and thorough in his duty to his people. He insured that the levels of relief for Rio Grande farmers would not be diminished.<sup>45</sup> He also insisted on larger benefits for New Mexico's many veterans, and announced strong opposition to a regressive Federal sales tax which would have crippled his underprivileged state.<sup>46</sup> Such services for the state's narrow interests were always expected of a freshman congressman, but Dennis Chavez displayed unmatched intensity. Such an attitude did little to enhance his stature in the House of Representatives, but his stunning victory over Jose Armijo in 1932 (94,764 to 52,905) even topped Roosevelt's huge majority in the state. During the next term, Chavez demonstrated the same zeal for New Mexico's interest with little concern for national problems. In addition after Senator Sam G. Bratton's resignation in May 1933 and the death of Democratic Governor Seligman in September, Chavez became more openly involved in state politics.<sup>47</sup> By November 1933 he had become the fourth New Mexican since statehood to serve on the powerful Democratic National Committee, which had influence over patronage.<sup>48</sup> By 1934, Dennis Chavez had risen to the top of the State Democratic Party, but prac-

tical and shrewd as ever, he realized that the enigmatic Bronson Cutting still held sway over the popular imagination. All the contributions from Federal coffers which Chavez could muster could not match the electrifying appeal of New Mexico's lone national hero, or so it seemed to many. After years of struggle and preparation on both sides, the dramatic battle of the patrones would shake politics in New Mexico as it has not been shaken since.

### III. THE MONUMENTAL CAMPAIGN, 1934

CUTTING'S MANEUVERS for re-election began in 1932. Franklin Roosevelt was still clinging to conservative economics—"at Pittsburgh in October [1932] he condemned the Hoover administration for failing to balance the Federal budget, describing Hoover's spending as 'most reckless and extravagant.'"<sup>49</sup> Yet Bronson Cutting, already an advocate of enormous expansion of the Federal government, was urging deficit spending to meet the crisis. When Dennis Chavez argued for a twenty-five per cent cut in Federal expenses, Cutting countered that:

The resources of this country are well nigh inexhaustible. There is no real danger to the maintenance of our public credit. What we do need is an immediate expansion of employment on a colossal scale by the Federal Government.<sup>50</sup>

At a time when the New Deal did not really have shape in FDR's thinking, Cutting was predicting that " 'public works will not solve unemployment but they will start things going by increasing buying power among the masses.'"<sup>51</sup> In the *Congressional Record* of the seventy-eighth Congress, Bronson Cutting favored public ownership of utilities and nationalization of banks.<sup>52</sup> Later, he cited the failure to nationalize the banks during the crisis of March 1933 as "President Roosevelt's great mistake."<sup>53</sup> Such economic heresy was compounded by the Senator's repudiation of every article in the traditional Republican faith: He was wet, strongly favored recog-

dition of Russia, and held the tariff in contempt.<sup>54</sup> As the Hundred Days began in 1933, with FDR urging cutbacks in Federal spending, Cutting risked their long friendship by opposing such tactics as the slash of veterans' benefits. In short, Senator Cutting, who had rarely been equivocal on any major issue, became convinced early in the Depression that the Federal government was the only instrument powerful enough to energize the economy and bring acclaim to men of progressive vision.

As 1934 dawned, it indeed appeared that Bronson Cutting would be the overwhelming choice for United States Senator. He had abandoned the official structure of the sinking Republican Party in 1932. By his support of maverick groups such as *El Club Político Independiente*, a vital front for bolting Republicans, he had profited from the Democratic victory.<sup>55</sup> For this, the Old Guard despised him more than ever. Holm Bursum, J. M. Hervey, Ed Safford, and Lem White—once leading names in the Republican Party—held a conference in the summer of 1934 with the exclusive purpose of crucifying Cutting.<sup>56</sup> The Simms family, upper class New Mexicans who had married into the Mark Hanna dynasty, likewise set out to stop this rabid Republican. Cutting only laughed.

Indeed, these attacks seemed to strengthen his popularity, because the Baron system of politics had lost its authority in the deepening economic crisis. Thirty per cent of New Mexicans were on relief.<sup>57</sup> Few of them listened any longer to the platitudes which had promised progress and prosperity during the halcyon Twenties. Middle-ranking Republicans scrambled to support the one man with a positive anti-depression program—the only one among them with a solid chance for victory. In an unusual flash of insight, the *New Mexico State Tribune* outlined the factors necessary for any Cutting-Republican reconciliation:

Mr. Cutting . . . has always been too smart to be cornered. He holds a balance of power and knows how to use it. He is a master politician. . . . For years old line politicians sniffed at his political ability. After about the fourth defeat they began to reconsider. Mr. Cutting has the

gift of calculating rashness. . . . The Republican Party will come to Cutting because it has decided that such is the way to win.

Mr. Cutting is . . . the unregenerate rebel who appreciated the net returns of rebellion. Senator Cutting wins political combats because he combines high intelligence with measured courage. He knows when to threaten and when to retreat.<sup>58</sup>

The Republicans did come to Cutting, and on his terms. First, he insisted that the party take a more liberal stance than the straggling Democrats. One writer maintains that the 1934 GOP platform had by far the broadest understanding of social responsibilities, of welfare provisions, and of concerns voiced by workers.<sup>59</sup> This opinion is substantiated by the enthusiastic support given Cutting by labor unions, which had always supported Chavez in the past.<sup>60</sup> Fleta Springer in the *New Republic* dismissed Chavez as a reactionary and revealed the underground desire of conservatives to "get Cutting in 1934 and defeat Roosevelt in 1936."<sup>61</sup> Lower-income groups applauded Cutting's firm stand against the Democrats' state sales tax which Chavez had been forced to endorse. On the other end of the spectrum, Cutting shrewdly lured the president of the New Mexico Petroleum Association into his ranks.<sup>62</sup>

In short, the Senator had succeeded in establishing the coalition of Spanish Americans and dispossessed Anglos around the state's periphery. When the air cleared in New Mexico, this lone Republican was elected in 1934, the only man in his party to win statewide office until 1950.

#### IV. OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE

ON THE WHOLE, the election was a disappointment to state Democrats. Like so many others, the campaign bogged down into threats and rebuttals, charges of disloyalty, and allegations that public officials had over-profited.<sup>63</sup> There was much traditional rhetoric tailored to the economic crisis, but Democrats expected that the same forces that swept them to victory in 1932 would do so again. This was not to be the case: Carl Hatch led the state ticket with an

unimpressive fifty-five per cent majority over a weak Republican opponent. Several other Democrats barely outdistanced their counterparts.<sup>64</sup>

There were reasons for such weakness. Although Roosevelt was popular, he was unable to campaign for anyone within the state. Certainly the New Deal programs were not as well coordinated nor as massive as they would be in 1936. Democratic Governors Seligman and Hockenull had inspired no one, and their policies were warmed over from the Twenties. In my opinion, the chief source of Republican strength was Bronson Cutting's insight. Through his prowess, the state GOP had stolen many issues and much thunder from Democrats. As at Yorktown, the band played "The World Turned Upside Down."

Speaking from the reportorial standpoint only [said the *Albuquerque Tribune*] we do not recall a New Mexico campaign more scrambled as to issues and causes than the current one. Just now we have the republican party running on a Roosevelt platform. The democratic party, though Rooseveltian, is attracting anti-Cutting republicans. The republican national committeeman denounced the republican ticket. . . . Devoted Cutting supporters are ignoring candidate Dillon for the Senate. Democrats here and there are espousing the cause of Senator Cutting.

Only the election will unscramble this egg.<sup>65</sup>

The egg was certainly unscrambled in the Cutting-Chavez race, and it hatched the next generation's ideas about political strength in New Mexico.

An analysis of key counties, as set forth on the following page,<sup>66</sup> shows that Cutting's strategy was sound, even though he defeated Chavez by only 2,284 votes out of 152,172. It is essential to remember that Dennis Chavez was the strongest Democratic candidate in New Mexico's history and that his campaign was superb. Nevertheless, several trends should be noted. Chavez and the Democrats were increasingly taking the Spanish-speaking vote away away from Republicans even when a candidate with a Spanish surname ran against Chavez in 1932. Cutting completely re-

EIGHT NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH OVER 70% SPANISH-SPEAKING  
POPULATION

County	1930		1932		1934	
	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Mora	1879	2066	1527	2873	2209	2330
Rio Arriba	3032	3552	2032	5148	4042	4449
Taos	1830	2618	2981	3183	3233	3774
Guadalupe	1223	1790	1616	1839	1986	1643
Sandoval	1302	1424	1541	1837	2087	1768
Valencia	2751	2067	3151	2344	3224	2142
San Miguel	4808	3809	5767	4610	6852	4006
Socorro	1693	1916	1890	2539	3046	2479
TOTALS	18,518	19,242	20,505	24,328	26,679	21,591

THREE NEW MEXICO COUNTIES WITH MOST MINING LABOR VOTE

County	1930		1932		1934	
	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Santa Fe	3974	3607	3636	5710	5040	4988
Colfax	2910	3330	3120	4367	3796	3575
McKinley	1683	1576	1237	2202	1782	1744
TOTALS	8567	8513	7933	12,279	10,618	10,307

SIX COUNTIES ON THE EAST SIDE WHICH WERE TRADITIONALLY  
DEMOCRATIC

County	1930		1932		1934	
	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
Eddy	637	1836	715	3593	1233	2658
Chaves	1782	2641	1581	4402	2618	2866
Roosevelt	334	1433	446	2831	971	1919
Curry	691	2141	768	3661	1632	3139
Quay	994	1931	806	2911	2028	2027
Lea	227	1186	245	2317	694	1652
TOTALS	4665	11,168	4651	19,715	9176	14,261

BERNALILLO COUNTY

	1930		1932		1934	
	Simms	Chavez	Armijo	Chavez	Cutting	Chavez
	5947	8317	5875	12,203	9182	9454

versed that trend. It is also clear that labor votes in the mining districts had been solidly Democratic in 1932. There Cutting was able to force a draw: Only the large vote on the east side saved Chavez from worse defeat, and even then Senator Cutting attracted five thousand votes more than the 1932 Republican total. The crucial Bernalillo county vote which had gone overwhelmingly for Chavez as congressman was likewise split in 1934 as mercantile interests and Spanish Americans were torn between Roosevelt's New Deal and Cutting's philosophy.

Bronson Cutting had electrified the Republican Party in New Mexico. Speculation that Cutting would be the Republican nominee to oppose the giant Roosevelt in 1936 immediately intensified.<sup>67</sup> He was absolute dictator of his disheveled party in the state and was clearly the only man with vision enough to challenge the New Deal there. Bronson Murray Cutting, however, had enjoyed his last victory. Six months later he died in a foggy field near Kirkland, Missouri, in an eerie plane disaster.<sup>68</sup> With him the new Republican Coalition in New Mexico passed. The 1936 election crushed whatever life Cutting had breathed into his adopted party. No state Democrat won by less than 20,000 votes. Cutting's "Forgotten New Mexican" had voted Democratic, and it would be a long, long time before he changed.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

FIRST, to determine whether Bronson Cutting was a charlatan, we must put aside his personal idiosyncrasies and concentrate on his political philosophy and his view of government's proper functions. Regardless of party label, Cutting had insisted since the nineteen twenties that public authority should be an active participant in the processes of social change. Government had to have powers to strike directly at evils produced by an industrial society. In many of these attitudes he was similar to progressives of earlier periods, but Cutting had no illusions about return to a simpler America, or the effectiveness of negative public action such as trust busting.

Rather, he advocated positive programs of welfare to aid the underprivileged and to give them weapons to fight for a larger share of the American Dream against guardians of the more ample portion. Only a strong paternalistic government with a thrust for economic equality could achieve these ends. Cutting's friends were bound to him by personal loans and favors, and he could understand the powerful appeal of men who offered a system of direct aid to destitute New Mexicans. He further understood that government services were coming to mean much more to the people than either free enterprise rhetoric or minimal patronage by state or Federal governments.

Obviously such a philosophy appealed more and more during the Great Depression. Cutting was in tune with the times. As a spokesman for massive government he was recognized in a way that Bob LaFollette, George Norris, and Hiram Johnson never were.<sup>69</sup> In addition, the Senator from New Mexico demonstrated, admittedly on a small scale, that rural and urban interests could be welded together into an electoral bloc based on a single philosophy of government, an achievement rarely realized by progressives in the past.

Secondly, we must confront the question, why did Dennis Chavez challenge the only man in New Mexico who could possibly have defeated him? The traditional answer maintains that Chavez was jealous of Cutting's leadership among Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. It is difficult to swallow this assertion for several reasons. Chavez could have assaulted Cutting's hold over the Rio Grande counties just as effectively if he had been elected as the senior Senator's counterpart. Defeat of incumbent Senator Carl Hatch in the primary could have done that for Chavez. Bronson Cutting was at the height of his popularity, especially in the counties which Chavez had to win, and the Congressman, with his sensitive system of political feelers, surely realized this. Dennis Chavez won elections because he was a superb tactician and a careful organizer. He was, after all, a patient and persistent man; after the election he doggedly pursued Cutting's seat all the way to the Senate Elections Committee.<sup>70</sup> Such a man would not have been



blinded by ethnic jealousy to the extent of unnecessarily risking his entire political future.

Recently it has been said that Chavez and his fellow Democrats underestimated Cutting's strength in the aura of the New Deal. This supposition has merit but needs amplification. No Democrat in New Mexico (with the possible exception of Albuquerque's Clyde Tingley) accurately perceived the political changes which began around 1930. Certainly men like Chavez understood that their party was strengthened by the fact that Republicans had been caught in the maelstrom, but the only conclusion to be drawn from studies of their thinking in 1934 is that they did not realize the direction the political current was taking. Chavez had little conception of Cutting's coalition strategy. He analyzed the situation in terms of the old Baron rules for victory. Had he not gone far enough when he sought out popular issues and balanced political forces?<sup>71</sup> Had he not placed his supporters in key positions with control over patronage? Had he not carefully measured out phrases perfected through long years of political practice? Everything in the past of Dennis Chavez pointed to victory. Moreover, he continued to believe the national administration could defeat any Republican.

But this time Chavez' instincts failed. Political influence no longer rested exclusively upon patronage in the traditional sense but also upon the all-embracing system of relief and work projects which Cutting supported. Individual favors from Congressman Chavez could not compare to the lightning collective action in time of severe need by the massive government which Cutting proposed. The New Deal and Cutting were partners in a sense. The crucial difference was that Roosevelt experimented his way into larger efforts<sup>72</sup> while Cutting had always been for big government to meet big challenges.

Finally, President Roosevelt's endorsement of Congressman Chavez must be explained, especially in the light of FDR's support for several pro-administration progressives who challenged Democrats. Again, several theories have been advanced. The first is that the President became angry over Cutting's insistence on increased

veterans' benefits. Other, more recent, ones include Roosevelt's resentment at an intemperate remark Cutting made about his polio, and the administration's constant disapproval of third party politics.<sup>73</sup>

There were other avenues, however, which might have led FDR down the way to Dennis Chavez. The Congressman was not really a conservative. His voting record indicates substantial support for the New Deal. Chavez was certainly impressed by Roosevelt's ebullient courage and the enormous presidential power. Furthermore, Chavez had no real philosophy of government; he was a man who liked popular projects. Time after time he stressed that he would back what the people wanted. Beginning in 1933, public opinion clearly favored the New Deal, and the pragmatic Congressman was certain to endorse any legislation with direct benefits to his constituents. In that respect, the President could count on him.

Another aspect of this twisted game undoubtedly plagued Roosevelt. As a candidate in 1932, he had run a successful campaign by recalling the "Forgotten Man," the American in the middle and lower classes who had been left behind by the organizational power of industry and who was the real victim of the crunch of depression. FDR forged a coalition with such an appeal that it reversed many political patterns established since the Civil War. Not only was Bronson Cutting struggling for the votes of the "Forgotten New Mexicans," but in many instances his insights were clearer than the President's. Cutting, indeed, had proved that he could unify agrarian and urban progressivism in ways that other national figures could not. Invariably, if they remained in the Republican Party or went independent, progressives won in the 1930's only when they faced extreme or outrageous opponents.<sup>74</sup> Progressives were independent by nature and usually disorganized. Cutting proved that he could overcome these drawbacks and make a much broader appeal than either the Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson brands of progressivism. This controversy was still raging during the New Deal. Cutting's insistence on a bold, new government in favor of the farmer, the worker, and dispossessed

minorities frightened many of these liberals, but in time this became their political standard.

CUTTING'S POLITICAL FORESIGHT and his personality made him increasingly invincible. He had always reflected confidence and control. He had always been noble yet merciless. Like Roosevelt, Bronson Cutting appeared courageously tough when facing the powerful financial interests, but favorable media loved to portray his tenderness with the helpless—in New Mexico, with brown farmers. Yet the public perceived no erratic experimenter in Cutting. Rather they saw a man of consistent vision who had finally come into his own.

Richard Hofstadter maintains that “the Progressive mind was hardly more prepared than the conservative mind for what came in 1929.”<sup>75</sup> Bronson Cutting is the exception. Perhaps the Senator did not perceive the dangers which his big-government philosophy harbored because he felt so strongly that it was the only answer to depression and political instability. Such a combination of personal traits and rugged insistence on paternalist ideology made Bronson Cutting a national figure to be reckoned with during these darkest days. Moreover, the hard-headed national leaders of the Republican Party saw the advantage of diverting into their own coffers the wealth of the “chief financial supporter of the nation’s progressives.”<sup>76</sup> Superb politician that he was, Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the danger, even from as unlikely a place as New Mexico.

## NOTES

1. *Albuquerque Journal*, October 10, 1934.
2. *Albuquerque Tribune*, November 2, 1934.
3. National news magazines were fascinated by Senator Cutting's personality. The best examples are: Jan Spiess, "Feudalism and Senator Cutting," *American Mercury*, vol. 33 (1934), pp. 371-74; O. P. White, "Cutting Free," *Colliers*, vol. 94 (October 27, 1934), pp. 24 *et passim*, and "Membership in Both Clubs," *American Mercury*, vol. 25 (1932), pp. 182-89.
4. Richard Beaupre, "The 1934 Senatorial Election in New Mexico" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1969), pp. 19, 93. Jonathan R. Cunningham, "Bronson Cutting" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1940), pp. 191-92. Ernest B. Fincher, "The Spanish Americans as a Political Factor in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, New York University, 1950), p. 151.
5. "But there was much sentiment for John Garner, our neighbor from Texas, who appealed to the conservative, southern-oriented old timers in the party. Governor Clyde Tingley and Hannett as well as Chavez, were for Garner." Clinton P. Anderson and Milton Viorst, *Outsider in the Senate* (New York, 1970), p. 27. See also Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes*, vol. 1 (New York, 1953), p. 217. For a sound critique of this particular campaign, see Beaupre.
6. Almost every work on New Mexico politics has an extensive account of Bronson Cutting. The leading analyses which deal exclusively with him are: Patricia Cadigan Armstrong, *A Portrait of Bronson Cutting Through His Papers*, Department of Government *Bulletin*, no. 57 (Albuquerque, 1959); Beaupre; Cunningham; Charles Judah, *The Republican Party in New Mexico*, Department of Government *Bulletin*, no. 20 (Albuquerque, 1949); Francis McGarity, "Bronson Cutting, Senator from New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1934); Andrea A. Parker, "Arthur Seligman and Bronson Cutting: Coalition Government in New Mexico, 1930-1933" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1969); Gustav Seligmann, "The Political Career of Bronson Cutting" (unpublished dissertation, University of Arizona, 1967).
7. Arthur Thomas Hannett, *Sagebrush Lawyer* (New York, 1964), p. 156. Robert G. Thompson, "The Administration of Governor Arthur T. Hannett" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1949). Full analysis of the Hannett-Cutting fight also appears in Charles B. Judah, *Governor Richard C. Dillon: A Study in New Mexico Politics*, Department

of *Government Bulletin*, no. 19 (Albuquerque, 1948), pp. 13-15. Armstrong has an excellent primary account on pp. 37-38.

8. New Mexico Taxpayer's Association, *The New Mexico Tax Bulletin*, vol. 6, no. 3 (June 1927), p. 1. For these years, these *Bulletins* provide the most detailed information on New Mexico's economy and conservative attitudes concerning her government.

9. Jack Holmes, *Politics in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1967), p. 200. "In essence, two entities of government operated [during the New Deal] in every area of the state. The traditional offices of state government operated as before. . . . At the same time, an overlapping pattern of federal work relief and related agencies based on local and state units or areas of government grew rapidly. Legally and financially distinct though the state and federal agencies were, they were also, politically and operationally, so closely related that they were directed and staffed from the same source [the Democratic Party]."

10. This is personal correspondence from J. M. Hervey to Governor Dillon written on Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections stationery, January 17, 1928. Richard C. Dillon Collection of Papers, University of New Mexico.

11. Address of Richard Dillon at Willard, New Mexico, on October 15, 1928. Dillon Collection.

12. *Albuquerque Journal*, November 10, 1928.

13. In spite of Governor Dillon's brash use of the National Guard to prevent the Colorado Coal Strike (1927) from spilling into New Mexico, the two counties with the most miners supported Dillon by 53.3% of their vote whereas in 1926 they had narrowly gone for Democrat Hannett. See Dwight Ramsay, "A Statistical Survey of the Voting Behavior in New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1952), pp. 124, 126, 130, and 132; and Charles Bayard, "The Southern Colorado Coal Strike of 1927-8 and New Mexico's Preventative Measures" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1949).

14. The term "Spanish Americans" which was widely used by the news media during the New Deal era is justifiably out of favor with many chicanos at this time. The problem of reference to Spanish-speaking New Mexicans has caused me much worry, but I have decided to use the term "Spanish Americans," which was in vogue during the Thirties, in order to avoid anachronism.

15. *New Mexico Tax Bulletin*, vol. 10, no. 4 (July-August 1931), pp. 95-96.

16. Paul Beckett, *The Soil Conservation Problem in New Mexico*, Department of Government *Bulletin*, no. 2 (Albuquerque, 1946), p. 2.

17. George I. Sanchez, *Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1940), p. 13.

18. Hugh Woodward, "Needed Constitutional Changes in New Mexico," *New Mexico Business Review*, vol. 4 (January 1935), p. 70.

19. For the social and political integration of Spanish Americans during this era, the best studies (in addition to Fincher and Sanchez) are: Ruth Barker, "Where Americans Are Anglos," *North American Review*, vol. 228 (1929), pp. 568-73; Alfred Cordova, "Octaviano Ambrosio Larrazolo, the Prophet of Transition in New Mexico: An Analysis of His Political Life" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1950); Leo Grebler, "Mexican Immigration to the United States: the Record and its Implications," *Mexican American Study Project* (Division of Research, UCLA Graduate School, 1966); John T. Russell, "New Mexico: A Problem of Parochialism in Transition," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 30 (1936), pp. 285-87, and "State Regionalism in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1938); Paul Walter, "A Study of Isolation and Social Change in Three Spanish Speaking Villages in New Mexico" (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 1938).

20. For instance, in 1915 there had been twenty-two Spanish periodicals with a circulation of 15,000. By 1929, the number was down to ten. By 1938, the end of the New Deal in New Mexico, there were only four with 5,000 readers. Fincher, p. 280.

21. Armstrong, p. 39; Cunningham, p. 220; Holmes, p. 166; Spiess, p. 373.

22. Warren Beck, *New Mexico: A History of Four Centuries* (Norman, 1962), p. 309.

23. In 1920, 15.6% of all New Mexicans over ten years of age were illiterate, which was 2½ times the national average. By 1930, the New Mexico rate had lowered to 13.3%, but only Louisiana and South Carolina had higher illiteracy rates. It is also important to note that in 1930, ten of the twelve least literate counties were highest in Spanish American population. J. E. Seyfried, "Illiteracy Trends in New Mexico," *University of New Mexico Bulletin*, vol. 8, no. 8 (March 15, 1934), pp. 31, 34-36.

24. James Swayne, "A Survey of the Economic, Political, and Legal Aspects of the Labor Problem in New Mexico" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1936), p. 8.

25. *New Mexico Tax Bulletin*, vol. 10, no. 3 (May-June 1931), p. 66.

26. Jennie Fortune, Secretary of State, *The New Mexico Blue Book* (Santa Fe, 1926). Secretary of State, *New Mexico Elections, 1911-1966* (Santa Fe, 1966).

27. Thompson, "Hannett," p. 133. This is a quotation from a personal

interview with Hugh Woodward, Lieutenant Governor under Richard Dillon, June 20, 1949.

28. One incident which has consumed many pages was the time Cutting in a rage induced by alcohol sent a henchman to deliver his resignation as Senator to Governor Dillon. The next few days were consumed by Cutting's valiant efforts to get the letter back. Vorley Rexroad, "The Two Administrations of Governor Richard C. Dillon" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1947), pp. 125-28.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

31. Judah, *Dillon*, p. 28.

32. Parker, pp. 9, 29. The same points are made in a variety of ways in Beck, pp. 310-11; Judah, *Dillon*, p. 34; Rexroad, p. 114. The impression undoubtedly comes from the tone of contemporary newspaper coverage: "The anti-Cutting group, whose members declared Friday night that this was not a labor bill fight, but was a fight to determine whether U.S. Senator-elect Bronson Cutting was to dominate the Republican Party. . . ." *Albuquerque Journal*, March 9, 1929.

33. For example, the First Legislature of New Mexico had sixteen Republicans, seven Democrats, and one Progressive-Republican in the Senate and twenty-eight Republicans against sixteen Democrats in the House. *New Mexico Blue Book, 1913* (Santa Fe, 1913), pp. 99-101.

34. Rexroad, p. 124.

35. Of all the accounts, only Charles Judah in *The Republican Party in New Mexico* (p. 10) brings up this point. Judah, however, does not pursue it into the Labor Commissioner fight or the 1934 election.

36. The only Spanish American in the Senate to vote against the Bill was M. A. Gonzales, a staunch enemy of Bronson Cutting. All the others were elected from non-labor counties and voted with Cutting's Progressives: Adam Gallegos from San Miguel; E. M. Lucero from San Miguel and Mora; A. C. Pacheco from Taos; E. D. Salazar from Rio Arriba and Sandoval.

37. Edward Lahart, "The Career of Dennis Chavez as a Member of Congress" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1958), pp. 2-8.

38. An authority on such *patrones* and their methods puts it mildly: "the absence of qualified voters at the polls is less a cause of concern than the presence of non-eligibles." Thomas C. Donnelly, *Rocky Mountain Politics* (Albuquerque, 1940), p. 230.

39. *Albuquerque Journal*, Evening Edition, August 16, 1930.

40. Lahart, p. 39.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
42. Ramsay, pp. 5-6.
43. A good example of a casualty of this system was O. A. Larrazolo, Governor from 1919 to 1921. He achieved national prominence through wise development of western lands programs, his assistance to public education, and the state's "Red" chasing during the Coal Strike of 1919, but Larrazolo was unable to gain support for renomination from older Republicans. Instead, he watched the prize go to a half-willing Judge from Socorro named Merritt Mechem. Cordova, pp. 89, 91.
44. *Albuquerque Journal*, Evening Edition, August 16, 1930.
45. Lahart, p. 57.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 87-88.
48. The others were Senator A. A. Jones, Arthur Seligman, and R. H. Hanna. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
49. David A. Shannon, *Between the Wars: America, 1919-41* (Boston, 1965), p. 144.
50. Quotation of Cutting in H. J. Hagerman, "Ducking and Cutting—an Uncensored Review," *New Mexico Tax Bulletin*, vol. 11, no. 9 (November 1932), p. 212.
51. *New Mexico State Tribune*, December 7, 1932.
52. Cunningham, p. 213.
53. Cutting, "Is Private Banking Doomed?" *Liberty*, March 31, 1934. Quotation is in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston, 1958), p. 5.
54. White, "Both Clubs," p. 189.
55. Parker, p. 22.
56. Holmes, pp. 172-73.
57. Thomas Donnelly, *The Government of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1953), p. 148.
58. *New Mexico State Tribune*, Editorial, February 3, 1934.
59. Swayne, p. 58.
60. The New Mexico State Federation of Labor supported Cutting, but the powerful Albuquerque Central Labor Union did not. Cutting received the endorsement of William Green, President of the A.F. of L. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30, and E. E. Maes, "The Labor Movement in New Mexico," *New Mexico Business Review*, vol. 4 (1935), p. 139.
61. Fleta Springer, "Through the Looking Glass," *New Republic*, vol. 80 (November 7, 1934), p. 358.
62. The list of organizations and public officials which endorsed Bronson Cutting is enormous. See Lahart, pp. 109-12, and Beaupre, pp. 40, 46.



63. The *Albuquerque Journal* on October 22 charged that twenty-two relatives of Dennis Chavez were on the Federal payroll. John Miles said that Cutting had aided Communists financially and that he had corrupted the State American Legion. Lahart, p. 114. Ruth Hanna Simms compared Cutting to Hitler and Mussolini in the *Albuquerque Tribune* on November 5, 1934.

64. The Democrats for Congress, Governor, and Secretary of State won by only 6,000 votes, or by 52%.

65. *Albuquerque Tribune*, Editorial, October 2, 1934.

66. See tables. Secretary of State, *Elections*, unpagged.

67. Diogenes, "The New Mexico Campaign, A Struggle Between Two 'Outlander Baronies,'" *Literary Digest*, vol. 118 (November 3, 1934), p. 13.

68. Beaupre, p. 87. Whispered rumors persist to this day that the crash was no "accident." Yet Gustav Seligmann, after months of research, uncovered no concrete evidence of foul play.

69. For instance, just before his death Bronson Cutting had decided to sponsor a large program of Federal aid to education. "In all the welter of new deal issues, no legislative action had been taken to meet the depression's effects on public school education," said a contemporary. "The odds were against [Cutting]. . . . Public School teachers were a politically inarticulate and ineffective group." R. W. Hogue, "Senator Cutting's Last Fight," *New Republic*, vol. 88 (May 29, 1935), p. 77.

70. Richard Beaupre concludes his work with a full account of the determined fight Chavez was waging against Bronson Cutting's victory. See also U.S. Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. *Report on the Chavez Election Contest*. Report no. 793, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., B9884, 1935.

71. In 1930 Chavez had supported the oil tariff when speaking in Roswell, but after travelling northward, condemned tariffs in general as benefiting only special interests. Lahart, p. 38. In 1932 he had insisted that the Federal Government had to cut expenditures but later voted consistently for emergency appropriations which greatly expanded the budget. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

72. "This country needs, and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation,' [FDR] told a graduating class at Oglethorpe University." James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York, 1956), p. 133.

73. Beaupre, pp. 89-92.

74. George W. Norris of Nebraska, for example, ran as an Independent for a fifth term in the U.S. Senate in 1936 against candidates from both parties. Terry Carpenter, the Democrat, was a radical who supported

the Townsendites and Long's "Share the Wealth" plans. He received half the number of votes that Norris did and trailed even the Republican. Two years earlier the LaFollette brothers had won statewide races as Progressives in Wisconsin but had been opposed by conservative Democrats.

75. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York, 1955), p. 306.

76. Donald R. McCoy, *Angry Voices: Left of Center Politics in the New Deal Era* (Lawrence, 1958), p. 203, n. 18.